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Presentation Title

The Borda Rule on Top-Truncated Preferences: An Axiomatic Study

(with Ulle Endriss)

Abstract

The Borda rule, originally defined on profiles of individual preferences modelled as linear orders over the set of alternatives, is one of the most important voting rules. But voting rules often need to be used on preferences of a different format as well, such as top-truncated orders, where agents rank just their most preferred alternatives. What is the right generalisation of the Borda rule to such richer models of preference? Several suggestions have been made in the literature, typically considering specific contexts where the rule is to be applied. In this work, taking an axiomatic perspective, we conduct a principled analysis of the different options for defining the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences.

Keywords

Social Choice Theory; Voting

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