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Presentation Title

Voter Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections
(with Francǫis Durand and Matías Núñez

Abstract

We study the potential for voter coordination in large elections. Drawing on equilibrium analysis and numerical simulations, we compare the three most basic rules for 3-candidate elections, under which voters may vote for exactly one candidate (Plurality Voting), for exactly two candidates (Anti-Plurality) or for one or two candidates (Approval Voting). As well-known since Duverger [1951], Plurality Voting allows for voter coordination, but the election is indeterminate: at least two candidates are plausible winners. By contrast, coordination always fails under Anti-Plurality Voting. We further show that Approval voting always permits coordination when a Condorcet winner exists, and also ensures that, in most cases, only this normatively appealing candidate can be elected. At the heart of our numerical results lies a novel algorithm computing voter best replies in a large election.

Keywords

Approval voting; Poisson games; Strategic voting; Condorcet consistency; Fictitious Play

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