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## *Presentation Title*

### **Rational Learning in Voting for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Rewards**

(with Hans Gersbach and Oriol Tejada)

## *Abstract*

In a common-value setup with two alternatives in which agents can gather information at a cost, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable rewards for its members can ensure that high or even optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. If information acquisition costs are public and can be shared among  $\{it\}$  individuals of the population, a committee made up of a few, or even one member implements the right alternative with the highest probability, provided that the information acquisition cost function is moderately convex. If information acquisition costs are private, rewarding committee members depending on the vote tally difference can induce committee members to acquire (close to) optimal levels of information. In such cases, committee size must typically also be small---at least in relative terms---, albeit never lower than three members.

## *Keywords*

Voting; cost sharing; information acquisition; reward scheme

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