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Presentation Title

Strategy-Proofness in a Mixed Domain of Single-peaked and Single-dipped Preferences

(with Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Marc Vorsatz)

Abstract

We analyze a problem in which the location of a public facility should be decided taking into account agents' preferences. We consider a mixed domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences in which the kind of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent is known, but there is no information about the position of her peak or dip and the rest of the preference. In this framework, we characterize all strategy-proof social choice rules. We also study which strategy-proof rules satisfy Pareto efficiency or anonymity.

Keywords

Social choice rule; strategy-proofness: single-peaked preferences; single-dipped preferences

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