

# Rouzbeh Ghouchani

## *Presentation Title*

### **Optimal Seller's Revenue with Asymmetric Bidders**

#### ***Abstract***

I analyze the optimal auction regarding seller's revenue for the case that there are risk averse and risk neutral bidders. Optimal auctions for risk neutral or risk averse bidders have been studied in literature. The existing literature takes the bidders all risk neutral or all risk averse and try to find optimal revenue auction for the sellers with or without certain conditions. As a first step in a larger research agenda of studying revenue optimal auction, I study an optimal auction with one risk averse and one risk neutral bidder. This auction, which includes two bidders and one seller, combines what exists in literature as the agents with quasilinear preferences and the agents with non-quasilinear preferences.

#### ***Keywords***

Risk averse bidder; Risk neutral bidder; Seller's revenue; Optimal allocation probability

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