Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design 2020 (CMID20)
from
Thursday, 11 June 2020 (00:00)
to
Saturday, 13 June 2020 (20:00)
Monday, 8 June 2020
Tuesday, 9 June 2020
Wednesday, 10 June 2020
Thursday, 11 June 2020
00:00
Life cycle of startup financing
-
Svetlana Boyarchenko
Life cycle of startup financing
Svetlana Boyarchenko
00:00 - 01:00
01:00
Manipulation of Attractiveness in Two-Sided Stable Matches
-
Gustavo Saraiva
Manipulation of Attractiveness in Two-Sided Stable Matches
Gustavo Saraiva
01:00 - 02:00
07:00
Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to economic environments
-
Saptarshi Mukherjee
Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to economic environments
Saptarshi Mukherjee
07:00 - 08:00
Stable Doctor-Hospital Matching Mechanisms under Distributional and Hierarchical Constraints
-
Yao Cheng
Stable Doctor-Hospital Matching Mechanisms under Distributional and Hierarchical Constraints
Yao Cheng
07:00 - 08:00
08:00
A comprehensive analysis of soccer penalty shootout designs
-
Petróczy Dóra Gréta
A comprehensive analysis of soccer penalty shootout designs
Petróczy Dóra Gréta
08:00 - 09:00
Allocating Positions Fairly: Auctions and Shapley Value
-
John Wooders
Allocating Positions Fairly: Auctions and Shapley Value
John Wooders
08:00 - 09:00
Land Reform Optimal Land Holdings and Redistribution
-
Yidi Xu
Land Reform Optimal Land Holdings and Redistribution
Yidi Xu
08:00 - 09:00
Pricipal-Agent VCG Contracts
-
Elisheva Shamash
Pricipal-Agent VCG Contracts
Elisheva Shamash
08:00 - 09:00
09:00
A strategic tax mechanism
-
Georgios Stamatopoulos
A strategic tax mechanism
Georgios Stamatopoulos
09:00 - 10:00
College admissions with ties and common quotas
-
Péter Biró
College admissions with ties and common quotas
Péter Biró
09:00 - 10:00
Mechanism Design with Narratives
-
Matthias Lang
Mechanism Design with Narratives
Matthias Lang
09:00 - 10:00
The Role of Information Design in Facilitating Trust and Trustworthiness
-
Michiko Ogaku
The Role of Information Design in Facilitating Trust and Trustworthiness
Michiko Ogaku
09:00 - 10:00
10:00
An economic theory of differential treatment
-
Emil Temnyalov
An economic theory of differential treatment
Emil Temnyalov
10:00 - 11:00
Menu mechanisms
-
Andy Mackenzie
Menu mechanisms
Andy Mackenzie
10:00 - 11:00
Neutral Public Good Mechanisms
-
Jin Yeub Kim
Neutral Public Good Mechanisms
Jin Yeub Kim
10:00 - 11:00
The Core of School Choice Problems
-
Qianfeng Tang
The Core of School Choice Problems
Qianfeng Tang
10:00 - 11:00
11:00
Keynote - Thursday June 11 2020
-
Johannes Hörner
Keynote - Thursday June 11 2020
Johannes Hörner
11:00 - 13:00
14:00
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too good to be true
-
Deniz Kattwinkel
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too good to be true
Deniz Kattwinkel
14:00 - 15:00
Coopetition Against an Amazon
-
Ronen Gradwohl
Coopetition Against an Amazon
Ronen Gradwohl
14:00 - 15:00
Dynamics of Collective Litigations
-
Danisz Okulicz
Dynamics of Collective Litigations
Danisz Okulicz
14:00 - 15:00
The Borda Rule on Top-Truncated Preferences: An Axiomatic Study
-
Zoi Terzopoulou
The Borda Rule on Top-Truncated Preferences: An Axiomatic Study
Zoi Terzopoulou
14:00 - 15:00
15:00
Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints
-
Zhou Yu
Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints
Zhou Yu
15:00 - 16:00
On the equivalence of weak- and cyclic-monotonicity
-
Alexey Kushnir
On the equivalence of weak- and cyclic-monotonicity
Alexey Kushnir
15:00 - 16:00
Optimal Political Institutions in the Shadow of Conflict
-
Andrea Canidio
Optimal Political Institutions in the Shadow of Conflict
Andrea Canidio
15:00 - 16:00
Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
-
Matthias Fahn
Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
Matthias Fahn
15:00 - 16:00
16:00
Analysis of One-to-One Matching Mechanisms via SAT Solving: Impossibilities for Universal Axioms
-
Ulle Endriss
Analysis of One-to-One Matching Mechanisms via SAT Solving: Impossibilities for Universal Axioms
Ulle Endriss
16:00 - 17:00
Countervailing Power
-
Leslie M. Marx
Countervailing Power
Leslie M. Marx
16:00 - 17:00
Majority rule on rhombus tilings and Condorcet super-domains
-
Gleb Koshevoy
Majority rule on rhombus tilings and Condorcet super-domains
Gleb Koshevoy
16:00 - 17:00
Measuring Freedom in Games
-
Hendrik Rommeswinkel
Measuring Freedom in Games
Hendrik Rommeswinkel
16:00 - 17:00
17:00
Application Costs as a Screening Instrument in Decentralized Matching
-
Sergei Balakin
Application Costs as a Screening Instrument in Decentralized Matching
Sergei Balakin
17:00 - 18:00
Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims
-
Bas Dietzenbacher
Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims
Bas Dietzenbacher
17:00 - 18:00
Limit orders under Knightian uncertainty
-
Christoph Kuzmics
Limit orders under Knightian uncertainty
Christoph Kuzmics
17:00 - 18:00
Screening Inattentive Agents
-
Jeffrey Mensch
Screening Inattentive Agents
Jeffrey Mensch
17:00 - 18:00
18:00
An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction
-
Alex Suzdaltsev
An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction
Alex Suzdaltsev
18:00 - 19:00
Multi-Battle Contests Finite Automata and the Tug-of-War
-
Julian Teichgräber
Multi-Battle Contests Finite Automata and the Tug-of-War
Julian Teichgräber
18:00 - 19:00
Optimal Non-Linear Taxation of Internalities
-
Andreas Gerster
(University of Mannheim)
Michael Kramm
Optimal Non-Linear Taxation of Internalities
Andreas Gerster
(University of Mannheim)
Michael Kramm
18:00 - 19:00
19:00
Implementation with farsighted agents
-
Michele Lombardi
Implementation with farsighted agents
Michele Lombardi
19:00 - 20:00
Matching with Minimum Quotas
-
Asefeh Salarinezhad
Matching with Minimum Quotas
Asefeh Salarinezhad
19:00 - 20:00
The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems
-
Yuan Ju
The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems
Yuan Ju
19:00 - 20:00
20:00
Did the reforms of the matching systems make them more fair?
-
Alexander S. Nesterov
Did the reforms of the matching systems make them more fair?
Alexander S. Nesterov
20:00 - 21:00
Dynamic Allocation without Money: the Limited Commitment Case
-
Renkun Yang
Dynamic Allocation without Money: the Limited Commitment Case
Renkun Yang
20:00 - 21:00
No-Regret Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
-
Modibo Camara
No-Regret Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Modibo Camara
20:00 - 21:00
The First-Price Auction under Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics
-
Bernhard Kasberger
The First-Price Auction under Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics
Bernhard Kasberger
20:00 - 21:00
21:00
Business Commonality Standardization and Product Cycles
-
Fanis Tsoulouhas
Business Commonality Standardization and Product Cycles
Fanis Tsoulouhas
21:00 - 22:00
Can society learn without opinion leaders?
-
Fedor Sandomirskiy
Can society learn without opinion leaders?
Fedor Sandomirskiy
21:00 - 22:00
Persuading a Receiver With a Simplistic Worldview
-
Maxim Senkov
Persuading a Receiver With a Simplistic Worldview
Maxim Senkov
21:00 - 22:00
22:00
Implementability of cooperative solutions
-
Hector Hermida Rivera
Implementability of cooperative solutions
Hector Hermida Rivera
22:00 - 23:00
Friday, 12 June 2020
08:00
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
-
Jianpei Li
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
Jianpei Li
08:00 - 09:00
Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation
-
Yangbo Song
Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation
Yangbo Song
08:00 - 09:00
09:00
Contracting with endogenously incomplete commitment: escape clauses
-
Thomas Tangerâs
Wolfgang Gick
Contracting with endogenously incomplete commitment: escape clauses
Thomas Tangerâs
Wolfgang Gick
09:00 - 10:00
Exploitative Priority Service
-
Alex Gershkov
Exploitative Priority Service
Alex Gershkov
09:00 - 10:00
Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms
-
Sander Renes
Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms
Sander Renes
09:00 - 10:00
Momentum and Heterogeneity in Contests
-
Marco Serena
Momentum and Heterogeneity in Contests
Marco Serena
09:00 - 10:00
10:00
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
-
Heiner Schumacher
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
Heiner Schumacher
10:00 - 11:00
Minimum number of searches in a delegated search model with no monetary transfers
-
Elnaz Bajoori
Minimum number of searches in a delegated search model with no monetary transfers
Elnaz Bajoori
10:00 - 11:00
Public Provisions of Professional Services
-
Krzysztof Szczygielski
Public Provisions of Professional Services
Krzysztof Szczygielski
10:00 - 11:00
Signaling competence for re-election
-
Emre Aytimur
Signaling competence for re-election
Emre Aytimur
10:00 - 11:00
11:00
Keynote - Friday June 12 2020
-
Pierpaolo Battigalli
Keynote - Friday June 12 2020
Pierpaolo Battigalli
11:00 - 13:00
14:00
A General Framework for Studying Contests
-
Thomas Giebe
A General Framework for Studying Contests
Thomas Giebe
14:00 - 15:00
Influential News and Policy-making
-
Federico Vaccari
Influential News and Policy-making
Federico Vaccari
14:00 - 15:00
Pricing unverifiable information
-
Elias Tsakas
Pricing unverifiable information
Elias Tsakas
14:00 - 15:00
School choice and loss aversion
-
Vincent Meisner
School choice and loss aversion
Vincent Meisner
14:00 - 15:00
15:00
Contest with Incomplete Information: When to Turn Up the Heat and How?
-
Mengxi Zhang
Contest with Incomplete Information: When to Turn Up the Heat and How?
Mengxi Zhang
15:00 - 16:00
Empirical strategy-proofness
-
Rodrigo Velez
Empirical strategy-proofness
Rodrigo Velez
15:00 - 16:00
Fuzzy Reciprocity: Contracting Limitations in Bidirectional Matching Markets
-
James Christian DeVries Fisher
Fuzzy Reciprocity: Contracting Limitations in Bidirectional Matching Markets
James Christian DeVries Fisher
15:00 - 16:00
Voter Coordination in Large Elections
-
Antonin Macé
Voter Coordination in Large Elections
Antonin Macé
15:00 - 16:00
16:00
Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games
-
Michael Greinecker
Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games
Michael Greinecker
16:00 - 17:00
Optimal sequential contests
-
Toomas Hinnosaar
Optimal sequential contests
Toomas Hinnosaar
16:00 - 17:00
Pick-an-object mechanisms
-
Inácio Lanari
Pick-an-object mechanisms
Inácio Lanari
16:00 - 17:00
Redistribution through Markets
-
Scott Kominers
Redistribution through Markets
Scott Kominers
16:00 - 17:00
17:00
Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders
-
Weiwei Zheng
Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders
Weiwei Zheng
17:00 - 18:00
Corporate bonds: Uniform auction under risk and budget limits
-
Lamprini Zarpala
Corporate bonds: Uniform auction under risk and budget limits
Lamprini Zarpala
17:00 - 18:00
Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection
-
Jack Stecher
Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection
Jack Stecher
17:00 - 18:00
Wasted Bribes: Designing Surprise Amnesties which Deter Collusion
-
Chris Stapenhurst
Wasted Bribes: Designing Surprise Amnesties which Deter Collusion
Chris Stapenhurst
17:00 - 18:00
18:00
Eliciting information for decision making
-
Caspar Oesterheld
Eliciting information for decision making
Caspar Oesterheld
18:00 - 19:00
Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
-
Tamás Solymosi
Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
Tamás Solymosi
18:00 - 19:00
19:00
Optimal Auctions with Signaling Bidders
-
Olivier Bos
Optimal Auctions with Signaling Bidders
Olivier Bos
19:00 - 20:00
School Choice with Preference Rank Classes
-
Szilvia Papai
School Choice with Preference Rank Classes
Szilvia Papai
19:00 - 20:00
Truth-Telling Dominating Strategy: Impossibilities of Shill-Proofness
-
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
Truth-Telling Dominating Strategy: Impossibilities of Shill-Proofness
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
19:00 - 20:00
20:00
Screening with Frames
-
Franz Ostrizek
Screening with Frames
Franz Ostrizek
20:00 - 21:00
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Unit Commitment Auctions
-
Joseph Duggan
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Unit Commitment Auctions
Joseph Duggan
20:00 - 21:00
Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
-
Nicolás Figueroa
Carla Guadalupi
Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
Nicolás Figueroa
Carla Guadalupi
20:00 - 21:00
Working to Learn
-
George Georgiadis
Working to Learn
George Georgiadis
20:00 - 21:00
21:00
Adverse Selection in the Market for Bank Capital with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences
-
Thomas Joseph Rivera
Adverse Selection in the Market for Bank Capital with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences
Thomas Joseph Rivera
21:00 - 22:00
Confidence Management in Tournaments
-
Qiang Fu
Confidence Management in Tournaments
Qiang Fu
21:00 - 22:00
Decentralized Matching with Transfers: Experimental and Noncooperative Analyses
-
Jiabin Wu
Decentralized Matching with Transfers: Experimental and Noncooperative Analyses
Jiabin Wu
21:00 - 22:00
22:00
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
-
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
22:00 - 23:00
Voter Attention and Distributive Politics
-
Carl Heese
Voter Attention and Distributive Politics
Carl Heese
22:00 - 23:00
Saturday, 13 June 2020
02:00
Selling two units of a customizable good
-
Gregory Pavlov
Selling two units of a customizable good
Gregory Pavlov
02:00 - 03:00
09:00
A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market
-
Marion Ott
A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market
Marion Ott
09:00 - 10:00
Evaluating opportunities when more is less
-
Yukinori Iwata
Evaluating opportunities when more is less
Yukinori Iwata
09:00 - 10:00
Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints
-
Xu Lang
Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints
Xu Lang
09:00 - 10:00
10:00
Dynamic Model Persuasion
-
Tomasz Sulka
Dynamic Model Persuasion
Tomasz Sulka
10:00 - 11:00
Optimal Project Design
-
Daniel Garrett
Optimal Project Design
Daniel Garrett
10:00 - 11:00
Rational Learning in Voting for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Rewards
-
Akaki Mamageishvili
Rational Learning in Voting for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Rewards
Akaki Mamageishvili
10:00 - 11:00
Strategy-proofness in a mixed domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
-
Oihane Gallo
Strategy-proofness in a mixed domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
Oihane Gallo
10:00 - 11:00
11:00
Keynote - Saturday June 13 2020
-
Benny Moldovanu
Keynote - Saturday June 13 2020
Benny Moldovanu
11:00 - 12:00
14:00
Learning while Bargaining: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics
-
Niccolò Lomys
Learning while Bargaining: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics
Niccolò Lomys
14:00 - 15:00
Robust Binary Voting
-
Qinggong Wu
Robust Binary Voting
Qinggong Wu
14:00 - 15:00
The core for housing markets with limited externalities
-
Bettina Klaus
The core for housing markets with limited externalities
Bettina Klaus
14:00 - 15:00
15:00
Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
-
Cédric Wasser
Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
Cédric Wasser
15:00 - 16:00
Optimal seller’s revenue with asymmetric bidders
-
Rouzbeh Ghouchani
Optimal seller’s revenue with asymmetric bidders
Rouzbeh Ghouchani
15:00 - 16:00
Price Skimming: Commitment and Delay in Bargaining with Outside Option
-
Dongkyu Chang
Price Skimming: Commitment and Delay in Bargaining with Outside Option
Dongkyu Chang
15:00 - 16:00
Rights and rents in local commons
-
Sjur Flåm
Rights and rents in local commons
Sjur Flåm
15:00 - 16:00
16:00
Deliberation and epistemic democracy
-
Huihui Ding
Deliberation and epistemic democracy
Huihui Ding
16:00 - 17:00
Gig Economy: a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model
-
Péter Kerényi
Zsolt Bihary
Péter Csóka
Gig Economy: a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model
Péter Kerényi
Zsolt Bihary
Péter Csóka
16:00 - 17:00
Optimal Marketplace Design
-
Berk İdem
Optimal Marketplace Design
Berk İdem
16:00 - 17:00
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
-
Francesc Dilme
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
Francesc Dilme
16:00 - 17:00
17:00
A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types
-
Zaifu Yang
A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types
Zaifu Yang
17:00 - 18:00
Mean-Preserving Unawareness in General Equilibrium
-
Keisuke Teeple
Mean-Preserving Unawareness in General Equilibrium
Keisuke Teeple
17:00 - 18:00
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies
-
Roberto Serrano
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies
Roberto Serrano
17:00 - 18:00
18:00
Mediating Conflict in the Lab
-
Evan Friedman
Mediating Conflict in the Lab
Evan Friedman
18:00 - 19:00
The Fragmentation of Views in a Democracy
-
Arseniy Samsonov
The Fragmentation of Views in a Democracy
Arseniy Samsonov
18:00 - 19:00